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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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It has been applied most often in
by our fourth canon of descent.
determining the devolution of ancestral property where the heir took
the same estate by devise that he would have taken by descent, and then
died intestate, survived only by collateral relatives of equal degi'ee on
both the paternal and maternal side and both claiming the estate as heirs'
at law. If the heir took by purchase, all the relations would take; if he
took by descent under the operation of the doctrine of worthier title,
only those heirs of the blood of the transmitting ancestor would take.
THOMAS H. LEATH.

Federal Practice--Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto on
the Evidence.
Plaintiff brought an action in a federal court in New York to re-.
cover damages for personal injuries incurred while he was in the defendant's employ. At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved
for a dismissal of the complaint because the evidence was insufficient
to support a verdict for the plaintiff, and also moved for a directed
verdict in its favor on the same ground. The trial court reserved its
decision on both motions, submitted the case to the jury subject to its
opinion on the questions reserved, and received a verdict for the plaintiff. Thereafter, the court held the evidence sufficient, the motions illgrounded, and entered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. On
appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals held the evidence insufficient and
reversed the judgment with a direction for a new trial.- Defendant
obtained certiorari in the Supreme Court 2 which modified the judgment
of the Circuit Court to direct a dismissal on the merits, and the judgment as so modified was affirmed. 3 The practice of reserving rulings on
questions of law and taking verdicts subject to the ruling was a wellestablished practice at common law and carried with it the authority to
make such ultimate disposition of the cause as the court might see fit.
Thus, since the Seventh Amendment4 to the Federal Constitution refers
to the rules of the common law in 1791, at the enactment of the AmendIN.C.CoDE (1935) §1654(4).
'Redman v. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc., 70 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 2nd,

1934).

-'Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 293 U. S. 541, 55 Sup. Ct. 89,

79 L. ed. 88 (1934).
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 55 Sup. Ct. 890 (U. S. 1935).
U. S. CoNsT. Amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
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ment, 5

this procedure was not a re-examination of the findings of fact
by a jury and a rendering of judgment contrary thereto such as would
make *itinvalid under that Amendment.
Originally at common law a judgment non obstante veredicto could
be granted only on the application of the plaintiff0 under matter apparent of record;7 hence, it was just one species of judgment on the
pleadings, but available only to the plaintiff in the action. This rule has
been relaxed, however, to allow either the plaintiff or the defendant to
make such motion, and the rule as modified has been recognized by the
federal courts.8 Whereas, at common law such a judgment could be
granted upon matter apparent of record, it could not be granted because
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. This rule of the
common law has been changed in some states by statute so that either
the trial or the appellate court may grant judgment non obstante
veredicto in certain circumstances where the verdict is found to be unsupported by the evidence. 10 The practice in such states was for a time
approved and followed in the federal courts," but it appears now settled
that a federal court may not enter such judgment regardless of such
statutes. The leading case on this point is that of Slocum v. New York
Life Insurance Company, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Van Devanter, holding that this practice of re-examining the
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. ed. 873
(1899) (Amendment VII, U. S. Constitution, refers to the common law of England, the rules of which allow a re-examination of the findings of the jury only

by a new trial granted by the trial court, or -when ordered by an appellate court
for error in law).
' German Ins. Co. v. Frederick, 58 Fed. 144 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893); U. S. v.
Gardner, 133 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904).
Sternberg v. First National Bank, 280 Fed. 863 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922).
s U. S. v. Gardner, 133 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904).
'Perkins v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 199 Fed. 712 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912).
1012 PURl. PA. STAT. (1929) §681 ("Wherever, upon the trial of any issue, a
point requesting a 'binding instruction has been reserved or declined, the party presenting the point may within the time prescribed for moving for a new trial, or
within such other or future time as the court shall allow, move the court to have
all the evidence taken upon the trial duly certified and filed so as to become part of
the record, and for judgment non obstante veredicto upon the whole record; whereupon it shall be the duty of the court, if it does not grant a new trial, to so
certify the evidence, and to enter such judgment as should have been entered
upon that evidence, at the same time granting the party against whom the decision
is rendered an exception to the action of the court in that regard. From the
judgment thus entered either party may appeal to the Supreme or Superior Court,
as in other cases, which shall review the action of the court below, and enter such
judgment as shall be warranted by the evidence taken in that court."); N. Y.
Cwvm PRAcTicE AcT (1931) §§459, 461.
'" Keiper v. Equitable Life Ass. Society, 159 Fed. 206 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1908);
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. McCune, 174 Fed. 991 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1909); FriesBreslin Co. v. Bergen, 176 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1909); Smith v. Jones, 181
Fed. 819 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1910) ; Cornette v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 195 Fed. 59
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1912).
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findings of the jury was not recognized at common law, and hence was
2
invalid under the Seventh Amendment.'
The principal case appears to make an exception to the broad rule
laid down in the Slocum case and its effect is to recognize the constitutional validity of at least one method of obtaining judgment non ob,stante veredicto on the evidence in the federal courts. Thus, the practical effect of the instant decision is that a litigant in a federal court
can secure judgment non obstante veredicto based on the evidence, and
avoid a new trial, only when the state in which the federal couft is sitting has adopted, by statute or by judicial approval, the common law
practice of reserving rulings. The difference thus drawn, between a
judgment non obstante veredicto on the evidence based on a reserved
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict and such judgment based on a
motion first made after a verdict is taken, is an insubstantial one.'1Z
Such a reservation is but a formality of interest to the historian of
procedure. While it is better to have the form of Ndgment non obstante
veredicto on the evidence in federal courts recognized by the instant case
than none, can not the Supreme Court provide for litigants a broader
relief from the needless expense and inconvenience of repeated new
trials? Two methods of providing such relief appear available. The
Supreme Court could abandon the "deadhand" of the common law in
its interpretation of the Seventh Amendment and hold that the Amendment does not prohibit a judgment non olbstante veredicto on the ev=228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523, 57 L. ed. 879 (1913) (the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict having been denied, the court entered judgment on a verdict
for the plaintiff; the Circuit Court of Appeals, relying upon the Pennsylvania
statute, reversed this judgment with a direction to enter judgment for the defendant. Held, judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals modified so as to direct a
new trial); Pedersen v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57
L ed. 1125 (1913) ; Young v. Central R. Co. of N. J., 232 U. S. 602, 34 Sup. Ct.
451, 58 L. ed. 750 (1914); Myers v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 233 U. S. 184, 34 Sup. Ct.
559, 58 L. ed. 906 (1914); Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Dubois Electric Co., 253
U. S. 212, 40 Sup. Ct. 514, 64 L. ed. 865 (1920) ; Eberhart v. U. S., 204 Fed. 897
(C. C. A. 8th, 1913) ; Evans v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 205 Fed. 638 (S. D"
Pa. 1913); Engomeon v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. P, Co., 210 Fed. 897 (C. C. A.
8th, 1914); Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 219 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) ; Glynn
v. Krippner, 60 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
'"The rule in the Slocum Case has been subjected to much criticism: Thorn-.
dyke, Trial by Jury in the United States Courts (1913) 26 HIv. L. Rv. 732
("The declaration of a majority of the court is a public misfortune, because it
destroys a simple means of enforcing, without the expense, delay, and uhcertainty
of a new trial, a right to which the decision shows that a party was entitled at
the trial."); Glynn v. Krippner, 47 F. (2d) 281 (D. C. Minn. 1934) (Federal
District Judge Sanborn, disregarded the opinion of the Supreme Court in the
Slocum Case, and granted a judgment twit obstante veredicto on the evidence in
favor of the plaintiff, saying, "What possible justification is there for denying the
court the right, after trial and verdict, to grant the judgment which they should
have granted during the trial, where only questions of law were involved? . .,
The only thing that is lacking is the presence of a jury, which performs no function whatever, so far as the questions of law are concerned.").
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idence, on a motion first made after a verdict is taken, thus leaving the
federal courts free to conform to the prevailing state practice sanctioning such procedure. 14 On the other hand, if it is thought that the common law test of the meaning of the right hy trial by jury should be
retained, the Supreme Court might, under the recent congressional
grant of authority to make rules of procedure to govern the federal
courts in actions at law,' 5 promulgate a rule providing for reserved rulings on motions during the trial, thus making available in all the federal
courts, 'irrespective of the practice of the state wherein sitting, the procedure for judgments non obstante veredicto, on the evidence approved
by the instant case.
KENNETH W. YOUNG.

Gaming-Conflict of Laws-Statutory Liability of Winner
for Penalties.
In Georgia there is a statute which authorizes the loser in a gambling
transaction to bring suit at any time within six months for the recovery
of the amount lost, and if he neglects to bring this action within the
allotted period any person may sue the winner and recover the amount
involved in the wager, one-half for himself and one-half for the county
educational fund.' With this statute as the basis of his action the plaintiff alleged that in 1930 the defendant entered into a gambling contract
in Fulton County, Georgia, with Lloyds Insurance Co. of London, England, the forfeit to be $2500 in case "Bobby" Jones won the four major
golf championships during that year; that Jones won the four championships; that the money was paid; ahd that although six months had expired the loser had not brought suit to recover its loss. The appellate
court reversed the lower court's ruling which sustained the defendant's
demurrer on the ground that the allegation that the contract was made
in Georgia was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.2
"'It has been -pointed out that such an interpretation is an unnecessary one:
Scheidt v. Dimick, 70 F. (2d) 558, 564 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934) (Mr. Justice Morton,
dissenting, said, "I do not think that the Constitution prohibits improvements in
the machinery for administering justice or restricts our procedural methods to
those in use in the days of hand looms and sailing ships.") ; Funk v. U. S., 290
U. S. 371, 384, 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 216, 78 L. ed. 369, 376 (1933) (Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority, said, "An adoption of the common law in general
terms does not require, without regard to local circumstances, an unqualified application of all its rules; the rules have been controlling in this country only so
far as they are suited to and in harmony with the genius, spirit and objects of
American institutions; the rules of the common law considered proper in the
eighteenth century are not necessarily so considered in the twentieth.").
1148 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. §723b (1934 Supp.).
1
GA. CoD ANzr. (Michie, 1926) §4256.
2 Tatham v. Freeman, 180 S. E. 871 (Ga. 1935).

